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DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE
F. E. Guerra-Pujol
I. INTRODUCTION
We often associate violence with extra-legal behavior1 or with the dark
side of law enforcement.2 But violence has also played a pivotal role in our
nation’s history and in the development of constitutional law. Simply put,
our government has often resorted to acts of “constitutional violence”3 to
effectuate major constitutional change. Consider the stain of slavery. From a
practical perspective, it was not the formal enactment of the Thirteenth
Amendment that eradicated this peculiar institution. Rather, it was the blood
spilled in such costly battles as Bull Run, Chickamauga, and Gettysburg that
settled the festering constitutional question of slavery once and for all.4 The
same logic applies to school desegregation and the Little Rock Crisis of
1957. From a practical perspective, it was not the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Cooper v. Aaron5 that diffused the crisis or that ended
school desegregation. Rather, it was President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
reluctant decision to send paratroopers of the 101st “Screaming Eagles”
Airborne Division into Arkansas in 1957, a full year before the Supreme



This article is part of an ongoing project of mine in which I explore the complicated role of
violence in law, a project that formally began in 2011 with a letter-essay I addressed to my
dear friend, colleague, and kindred spirit Carlitos del Valle. See F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Life,
Love, and Law: An Epistolary Exchange, 80 REVISTA DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE
PUERTO RICO 995 (2011). I continue to await Carlitos’s reply. It was my colleagues Daniel
Nina and Sonia M. Serrano who initially kindled my interest in this question at a colloquium
in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico in 2005.
1. See, e.g., F. E. Guerra-Pujol, Buy or Bite?, in ECONOMICS OF THE UNDEAD (Glen
Whitman & James Dow eds., 2014).
2. See, e.g., Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601 (1986).
3. In this paper, I shall use the term “constitutional violence” (or “domestic
constitutional violence”) to refer to the use of military force to enforce existing constitutional
rules within an existing legal system, as opposed to the use of reform or violence to create an
entirely new constitutional order. For an example of the latter form of foundational violence
(as opposed to reformational violence) see David Bates, Constitutional Violence, 34 J. L. &
SOC’Y 14 (2007).
4. See, e.g., JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1861−1865 (2013).
5. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Court’s decision in Cooper, that desegregated the iconic Central High
School and changed the course of United States civil rights history.6
Momentous constitutional questions are thus often decided not through
ordinary legal channels but by force. But the use of force to effectuate
constitutional change poses a constitutional puzzle. What is the relation
between violence and the overall system of representative government
created by the Constitution? After all, the federal courts and Congress do not
have their own armies to enforce their decisions or laws, so as a matter of
constitutional first principles, one could argue that a president is acting
“within” the law when he uses military force to enforce a law or court order.
But at the same time, the use of force is antithetical to the ideals of our
republican constitution.7 Eisenhower’s fateful decision to resort to military
force during the Little Rock Crisis thus poses a constitutional paradox.8 Is
there any viable solution to this paradox?
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to these questions and is
organized as follows. First, after reframing the Little Rock Crisis as a
paradigm example of constitutional violence, the paper revisits two obscure
cases that unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the legality of
Eisenhower’s use of force during the Little Rock Crisis of 1957. Although
neither case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, they pose
important questions about the legality of force in disputes over the meaning
of the Constitution. Next, the paper surveys the relevant constitutional
provisions as well as the major pieces of domestic violence legislation
enacted by Congress prior to the 1957 Little Rock Crisis. In brief, the
Constitution not only anticipates the possibility of “domestic Violence,”9
there is also a small corpus of federal law purporting to authorize and
regulate the use of constitutional violence. Lastly, the paper concludes by
suggesting a new global label for this delicate body of law: “the laws of
constitutional necessity.”

6. A detailed chronology of the events leading up to the Little Rock Crisis and the
deployment of federal troops in Arkansas appears in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper,
358 U.S. at 7−12. Additional primary source materials are available in LITTLE ROCK USA:
MATERIALS FOR ANALYSIS (Wilson Record & Jane Cassels Record eds., 1960) [hereinafter
LITTLE ROCK USA].
7. This tension recently re-rose to the surface in October of 2018 when President
Donald J. Trump unilaterally deployed more than 5,000 active-duty military troops to patrol
the United States-Mexico border. See Michael D. Shear & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Trump
Sending 5,200 Troops to the Border in an Election-Season Response to Migrants, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/us/politics/border-security-troopstrump.html.
8. Since this symposium issue is devoted to the case of Cooper v. Aaron, I will limit
the scope of this article to the Little Rock Crisis of 1957.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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II. THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A PARADIGM CASE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLENCE
With the hindsight of history,10 the remainder of this paper will reframe
the Little Rock Crisis of 1957 as a paradigm case of domestic constitutional
violence.11 On the one side, Governor Orval Faubus had called forth the
Arkansas Guard to prevent the desegregation of Central High School.12 On
the other side, President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to deploy
paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division to enforce federal court
desegregation orders.13 Although Governor Faubus and President
Eisenhower were thus motivated by competing visions of the Constitution,
their actions are nevertheless paradigmatic of constitutional violence.
Simply put, both executive officials employed the sundry military forces at
their disposal in order to preserve, protect, and defend their conflicting
interpretations of the Constitution.
Most, if not all, scholars have, however, neglected the constitutional
dimension of the use of force during the crisis.14 Furthermore, inasmuch as
Governor Faubus’s decision to call out the militia was intended to prevent
court-ordered desegregation, historians and legal scholars have framed the
governor’s action as a subversion of the Constitution.15 Yet one could make
a strong case that Governor Faubus was entitled to use all constitutional
powers at his disposal to promote his understanding, however morally
reprehensible, of the Constitution. After all, the United States Constitution
creates a federal structure of government, not a unitary one, and the

10. One of the advantages of the mere passage of time is that the present provides new
opportunities to see the past in different ways, or in the timeless words of French historian
Marc Bloch: “knowledge of the past is something progressive [that] is constantly
transforming and perfecting itself.” See MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN’S CRAFT 58 (Peter
Putnam trans., 1953).
11. This paper uses the term “paradigm” in the Kuhnian sense as an exemplary
application of a general theory to specific facts. See Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/thomas-kuhn/. Here, the general theory of
this paper is that the meaning of the Constitution has undergone change via the use of force.
12. Governor Faubus’s official proclamation calling out the State Militia is reprinted in
full in LITTLE ROCK USA, supra note 6.
13. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957).
14. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Foreshadowing the Future: 1957 and the United States
Black Freedom Struggle, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009). See also Steven R. Goldzwig &
George N. Dionosipolous, Crisis at Little Rock: Eisenhower, History, and Mediated Political
Realities, in EISENHOWER’S WAR OF WORDS: RHETORIC AND LEADERSHIP 195−97 (Martin J.
Medhurst ed., 1994).
15. See, e.g., TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 113−19 (1984).
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administration of public schools has historically been a matter of local law.16
But my deeper point is twofold: (1) Governor Faubus’s pro-segregation
interpretation of the Constitution, justified or not, was a form of domestic
constitutional violence, but (2) so to was President Eisenhower’s decision to
send in paratroopers. That most people today might condemn Faubus and
praise Eisenhower should not distract us from this main point: the fact that
the desegregation of Central High School would not have occurred had
Eisenhower not acted with such decisive military force in the fall of 1957.
III. TWO LITTLE ROCK CASES
Alas, the school desegregation cases, beginning with Brown v. Board
of Education,17 do not directly address the problem of constitutional
violence, like the possibility that physical force might be necessary to carry
out court-ordered desegregation. By way of example, Cooper v. Aaron,18 the
most well-known court decision arising out of the Little Rock Crisis and the
landmark case that is the subject of this symposium issue of the UA Little
Rock Law Review, barely even mentions President Eisenhower’s decision to
send the “Screaming Eagles” of the 101st Airborne into Little Rock.19
Instead, the Court appears to take the use of constitutional violence for
granted. In fact, most, if not all, historians and legal scholars of the civil
rights era have taken the legality of Eisenhower’s extraordinary enforcement
action and use of military force in Little Rock for granted.20
Nevertheless, there are two lesser-known Little Rock cases—one state,
the other federal—that present the problem of constitutional violence front
and center. In both of these obscure cases, Duncan v. Kirby21 and Jackson v.
Kuhn,22 private citizens who opposed desegregation attempted to challenge
16. At the time of the Little Rock Crisis in 1957, there was no federal department of
education. In fact, the United States Department of Education was not created until 1979,
when Congress enacted “The Department of Education Organization Act.” See Pub. L. No.
96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979).
17. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
19. Although the Court’s per curiam opinion fills up more than twenty pages of the U.S.
Reports and consists of more than thirty paragraphs, only three short sentences in the entire
opinion make any mention of President Eisenhower’s historic decision to employ military
force during the Little Rock Crisis: “[T]he President of the United States dispatched federal
troops to Central High School [on September 25, 1957] and admission of the Negro students
to the school was thereby effected. Regular army troops continued at the high school until
November 27, 1957. They were then replaced by federalized National Guardsmen who
remained throughout the balance of the school year.” Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
20. See, e.g., DAVID A. NICHOLS, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: EISENHOWER AND THE
BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2007).
21. Duncan v. Kirby, 228 Ark. 917, 311 S.W.2d 157 (1958).
22. Jackson v. Kuhn, 249 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
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President Eisenhower’s legal authority to send federal troops into Little
Rock. Neither case has received much attention from historians or legal
scholars, since neither ever reached the Supreme Court of the United States.
Nor did the courts decide the merits of the presidential power claims in these
cases.
A.

Duncan v. Kirby

Duncan v. Kirby23 was a state case decided by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas in March of 1958. The moving party in this case, one Vernon
Duncan, a pro-segregation protestor, was arrested in front of Central High
School on October 3, 1957 for “Disturbing the Peace” and for “Refusing to
Obey a Lawful Order of an Officer of the U.S. Army.”24 The Little Rock
Municipal Court acquitted Mr. Duncan of the “disturbing the peace” charge,
but it convicted him of the “refusing to obey” charge.25 To appeal this
conviction, Mr. Duncan went before the Pulaski County Circuit Court,
where he filed a motion to dismiss or reverse the conviction of the
Municipal Court, arguing among other things that President Eisenhower had
exceeded his legal authority to send U.S. troops into Little Rock.26 The
Circuit Court overruled his motion, and Mr. Duncan then took his case up to
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, petitioning for a Writ of Prohibition to
prevent the Circuit Court from punishing him on the refusing to obey
charge.27 A closely-divided Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled 4 to 3 in favor
of the defendant, Mr. Duncan,28 but the Court did not pass judgment on the
legality of President Eisenhower’s use of military force in Little Rock.29
Instead, a majority of the Arkansas justices decided this case on more
narrow grounds: that at the time of Duncan’s arrest it was not a crime in
Arkansas to refuse to obey a federal military order.30

23. Duncan, 228 Ark. at 917, 311 S.W.2d at 157.
24. Id. at 917, 311 S.W.2d at 158. See also id. at 923, 311 S.W.2d at 161 (Justice
McFaddin’s dissenting opinion, which contains a more detailed description of the procedural
posture of the case).
25. Id. at 917, 923, 311 S.W.2d at 158, 161.
26. Id. at 920−22, 311 S.W.2d at 160.
27. Id. at 917, 311 S.W.2d at 158 (“The issue is whether a writ of prohibition shall be
granted.”).
28. Duncan, 228 Ark. at 920−25, 311 S.W.2d at 160−62. (The dissenting justices would
have denied Mr. Duncan’s petition out of hand.)
29. Id. at 922, 311 S.W.2d at 160 (“We do not reach the point of whether the President
acted beyond the scope of his authority in ordering troops into Arkansas to enforce a court
decree.”).
30. Id. (“It simply is not against the law in Arkansas to fail to obey an order of an officer
of the United States Army. . . .”).
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As a further aside, although Duncan v. Kirby avoids the constitutional
violence issue, this obscure case is still worth mentioning, for it symbolizes
the overall deferential and lenient treatment that pro-segregation protestors
received during the Little Rock Crisis. According to one historian, by the
end of October of 1957, “some fifty-six persons had been arrested on
various State law charges connected with disorders at the school, but the
local police court had deferred the cases.”31 Of these 56 pro-segregation
protestors, only seven received a fine, and six of the seven had their fines
suspended.32 Moreover, not a single federal prosecution was brought against
any of the protestors.33 In any event, Duncan v. Kirby was not the only case
to challenge the legality of President Eisenhower’s use of force in Little
Rock.
B.

Jackson v. Kuhn

Like the Duncan case discussed above, the case of Jackson v. Kuhn34
presented a direct challenge to the legality of President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s fateful decision to send the “Screaming Eagles” of the 101st
Airborne Division into Little Rock. But unlike Duncan, which was a state
court case, Jackson v. Kuhn was commenced in federal court. The plaintiff
in this case was Mrs. Margaret Jackson, who was a vocal member of the
newly-created (and short-lived) Mothers’ League of Central High
School.35 The attorney for Mrs. Jackson was Kenneth Coffelt,36 who brought
this case in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas on October 2, 1957, naming as defendants Colonel William Kuhn,
the Commanding Officer of the 101st Airborne Division in Little Rock, and
Major General Edwin A. Walker, commanding officer of the Arkansas
Military District of the United States Army. The district court judge
31. PAUL J. SCHEIPS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS,
1945−1992, 62−63 (2005).
32. Id.
33. See OSRO COBB, PATHWAYS TO A GREATER FUTURE 249−50, 256 (Carol Griffee ed.,
1990). Osro Cobb was the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which includes
Little Rock, from 1954 to 1962. The second half of his self-published memoir, “Pathways to
a Greater Future,” recounts the Little Rock Crisis from his unique vantage point as the U.S.
Attorney in Little Rock.
34. Jackson v. Kuhn, 249 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
35. See Graeme Cope, ‘A Thorn in the Side’? The Mothers’ League of Central High
School and the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis of 1957, 57 ARK. HIST. Q. 160, 163 (1998).
For additional information about Mrs. Jackson’s role in the Little Rock crisis, see ELIZABETH
JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT SHOCKED THE NATION
169−70, 198−99 (2007).
36. Mr. Coffelt would run for Governor of Arkansas in 1962, but he garnered only 2%
of the popular vote in the primary. See ORVAL EUGENE FAUBUS, DOWN FROM THE HILLS 318
(1980).
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presiding over the case was Ronald N. Davies, who had recently replaced
another federal judge, John E. Miller.37
Mrs. Jackson’s federal complaint, which is dated October 2, 1957,
petitioned the court for a declaratory judgment.38 Specifically, the complaint
petitioned the court to declare unconstitutional Sections 332, 333, and 334
of Title 10 of the United States Code,39 the statutes that President
Eisenhower himself invoked in his executive order when he authorized the
use of military force in Little Rock.40 After Judge Davies dismissed the
complaint, Mrs. Jackson promptly appealed the district court’s dismissal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on October 30,
1957.41 The Eighth Circuit Court, however, affirmed the district court’s
dismissal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the case.42 But what if
the court of appeals or the district court had decided to decide this case on
the merits? Simply put, did President Eisenhower have the legal authority to
send United States Army paratroopers to Arkansas to enforce a federal court
order and restore the peace at Little Rock’s Central High School? If so, what
is the source of this constitutional violence power, and what are the outer
limits to this dangerous power?
IV. SOURCES OF DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE LAW
In a televised address to the nation on September 24, 1957, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower justified his historic decision to use force on
practical grounds: “Mob rule cannot be allowed to override the decisions of
our courts.”43 In addition, the Eisenhower Administration invoked two
separate sources of presidential power when it sent troops to Arkansas: the
37. For information on Judge Miller’s sudden and unexpected removal from the federal
district court and from the Cooper v. Aaron litigation, see JACOWAY, supra note 35, at
84−100. See also COBB, supra note 33, at 180.
38. See Jackson, 249 F.2d at 210.
39. Id. These three provisions of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. §§ 332−334) are
now codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 252−254 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 115-385).
40. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957).
41. See Jackson, 249 F.2d at 210.
42. See generally Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1958). At that time, a federal
question case, i.e. a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, had to meet an amount-incontroversy requirement of $3,000.00. See generally Note, Jurisdictional Amount in Civil
Rights Cases, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 302, 303 (1942). As an aside, Jackson v. Kuhn was decided
on the very same day as yet another Little Rock case, Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808 (8th
Cir. 1957), and the opinions in both cases were written by the same federal judge, John B.
Sanborn, Jr. See Thomas H. Boyd, Biography: The Life and Career of the Honorable John B.
Sanborn, Jr., 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 203, 293 (1997).
43. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address to the Nation (Sept. 24, 1957),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?434366-1/president-eisenhower-speech-rock.
See
also
NICHOLS, supra note 20, at 321 n.25.
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Constitution and three separate statutes enacted by Congress between 1795
and 1871.44 But neither Eisenhower’s proclamation nor his executive order
specify the provisions of the Constitution that authorize acts of
constitutional violence.
A.

Article II

The Constitution contains at least four textual sources of power that
might authorize the use of constitutional violence: (1) the Vesting Clause in
Article II of the Constitution,45 (2) the Commander-in-Chief Clause,46 (3) the
Take Care Clause,47 and (4) the Domestic Violence Clause in Article IV.48
Although each of these clauses are broadly worded, none of them refer
directly to the enforcement of court orders. Let’s consider each of these
sources of presidential power, beginning with the broad Vesting Clause in
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
1.

The Vesting Clause

The first sentence of Article II of the Constitution states that “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.”49 In addition, Article II of the Constitution requires the president
to take an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States.”50 One could thus argue that these two provisions, either
individually or in combination, authorize the president to use force and
engage in constitutional violence if necessary to protect and defend the
United States and the provisions of the Constitution. There are two
fundamental problems with this line of reasoning, however. One problem is
textual. Nowhere does the Constitution define the meaning of “executive
power.” The other major problem is structural. The Constitution is designed
to limit—not expand—political power, so why should presidential power be
44. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957). The preamble of the
executive order refers to “the authority vested in [the president] by the Constitution and
Statutes of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10, particularly sections 332, 333
and 334 thereof. . . .” See id. The preamble of the executive order also cites a fourth statute,
Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, which authorizes the president to designate
and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch “to perform . . .
any function which is vested in the President by law. . . .” See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (LEXIS
through Pub. L. 115-385).
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
48. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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the exception to this rule? In short, is the use of force inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution? This is the problem of “constitutional
violence.” What limits are there to this power?
2.

The Commander-in-Chief Clause

Next, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution creates a unified military
command structure, declaring the president to be “Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”51 This
broad delegation of military power, however, is limited in scope.
Specifically, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution confers on Congress the
power to declare war52, and likewise, the Militia Clauses in Article I, Section
8 grant to Congress, not the president, the exclusive power to call state
militias into service.53
Nevertheless, beginning with the first Militia Act of 1792,54 Congress
eventually delegated this calling forth power to the president via a series of
statutes dealing with domestic rebellions, internal insurrections, and
obstructions of federal law. Moreover, Congress subsequently expanded this
unilateral “calling forth” power in 1807 to include the use of federal military
forces.55 The Little Rock Crisis involved a large-scale obstruction of lower
federal court orders—namely, the previous federal district court orders by
Judge John E. Miller and Judge Ronald Davies affirming the Blossom Plan
and mandating the desegregation of Central High School.56 As a result, one
could argue that the events producing the Little Rock Crisis justified the use
of constitutional violence and that President Eisenhower acted lawfully
when he sent federal troops into Little Rock to enforce the court orders. But
does the enforcement of a court order really fall under the president’s
general executive powers or his military commander-in-chief powers?

51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 11.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
54. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264.
55. Naval Peace Establishment, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 443 (1807).
56. See Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 866 (E.D. Ark. 1957) (affirming the initial
desegregation plan of the Little Rock School District, known as “the Blossom Plan” after Mr.
Virgil Blossom, the Superintendent of Schools). See also Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220,
226 (E.D. Ark. 1957) (“The Governor does not . . . have lawful authority to use the National
Guard to deprive the eligible colored students from exercising their right to attend Central
High School, which right is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, the School District plan
of integration, and the Court’s orders entered in this cause.”).
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The Take Care Clause

Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution obliges the president to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”57 The president is thus charged
with the enforcement of federal law, but this provision begs the question of
which law was Eisenhower attempting to enforce when he sent troops into
Little Rock in 1957? At the time of the Little Rock Crisis, Congress had not
enacted any legislation requiring school desegregation.58 In fact, Congress
did not pass any legislation prohibiting racial segregation in the public
schools until the mid-1960s, when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.59
Instead, Eisenhower’s executive order refers only to the “enforcement
of orders of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas with respect to matters relating to enrollment and attendance at
public schools, particularly at Central High School, located in Little Rock
School District, Little Rock, Arkansas.”60 So, does a federal court order
count as a “law”? Although the Supreme Court of the United States had
unilaterally declared that racial segregation in public education violated the
Fourteenth Amendment when it decided the landmark case of Brown v.
Board of Education,61 it’s unclear (at best) whether a court’s interpretation
of the Constitution, even the Supreme Court’s, should count as a “law” of
the United States. This gap is especially embarrassing in the context of a
Fourteenth Amendment case like Brown, since Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment confers on Congress, not the courts, the power to enforce the
substantive protections contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.62
A.

Article IV

As we have seen thus far, Article II of the Constitution—the article
delegating “executive Power” to the president—does not really address or
anticipate the problem of constitutional violence; Article IV, however,
does.63 Specifically, Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution states, “The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
59. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
60. Exec. Order No. 10730, § 2, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957).
61. Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. The text of Section 5 reads in full: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
63. U.S. CONST. art. IV is the only provision in the entire Constitution to use the word
“violence.”
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can-not be convened) against domestic Violence.”64 Although, a case could
be made that the Little Rock Crisis generated troubling levels of “domestic
Violence,” the text of Article IV imposes two checks on a president’s power
to use constitutional violence.65 First, it limits the president’s use-of-force
powers to two categories: “invasions” and “domestic Violence.”66 Second, it
prohibits the president from acting on his own initiative in the second
category; instead, he must await a request from a state legislature or
governor before acting.67
To sum up, Article IV anticipates the problem of “domestic Violence,”
while Article II confers broad powers and duties on the president. In
addition to these general constitutional provisions, the Congress has also
enacted a series of laws delegating to the president the power to use violence
to enforce the laws and Constitution of the United States—laws that can be
traced back to George Washington’s first term as president.68
B.

Statutes

Aside from the general provisions found in Articles II and IV of the
Constitution,69 by 1957 Congress had enacted five specific laws authorizing
the president to use military force within the United States: (1) the first
Militia Act of 1792,70 (2) the Militia Act of 1795,71 (3) the Insurrection Act
of 1807,72 (4) the Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861,73 and (5) the
Enforcement Act of 1871.74 Combined, these laws pre-authorize the
president to commit acts of domestic constitutional violence under certain
conditions.
The content and historical development of this remarkable body of
“domestic violence” law has already been commented on by other
scholars.75 This paper, by contrast, will present the evolution of this body of
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See infra Section IV.A.
69. See supra Section IV.A.2.
70. Militia of the United States, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792).
71. Militia of the United States, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (1795).
72. Naval Peace Establishment, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 443 (1807).
73. Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281 (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. § 252 (1956)).
74. Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1979)).
75. If the reader is unfamiliar with this body of law, a good place to start is Professor
Stephen Vladeck’s excellent 2004 law review article on emergency powers and the Militia
Acts. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Powers and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L. J.
149 (2004). See also Dominic J. Campisi, The Civil Disturbance Regulations: Threats Old
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law as a three-act play and show how some of our previous presidents,
including Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, invoked these laws when
acting to preserve, protect, and defend the laws and territorial integrity of
the United States. The remainder of this paper will thus evaluate President
Eisenhower’s historic use of military force in Little Rock—and the legality
of domestic constitutional violence generally—in light of these laws.
1.

Act I: The Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795

When can a president use violence to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution or the laws of the United States? As we saw above, Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution gives to the Congress—not to the president—
the power “to raise and support armies” as well as the power “to provide for
calling forth the militia.” Nevertheless, the Congress delegated its
constitutional calling forth power to the president early in our nation’s
history, when Congress enacted the first Militia Act of 1792,76 President
George Washington would invoke this law when he called forth four state
militias in response to the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.77
In summary, the 1792 Act spells out three different procedures the
president must follow to call forth a militia, depending on the type of
domestic danger he is responding to:
• Invasion. When there is an invasion or an imminent threat of
invasion, the president may act unilaterally to repel the invasion.
• Insurrection. When there is an internal insurrection within a state, the
president’s authority to use military force is subject to a state veto of
sorts. Specifically, the president must first request authorization from
the state legislature or from the governor of the state, if the
legislature cannot be convened in time.
• Execution of the laws of the union. In order to use military force to
enforce federal law, the president must first request a certification
from an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
or from a federal district judge. Specifically, the associate justice or
district judge must certify that the laws of the United States are being

and New, 50 IND. L. J. 757 (1975). For an in-depth history of this body of law, see ROBERT
W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES, 1789−1878 (1988).
76. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, (repealed). Congress enacted a second
Militia Act a few days later on May 8, 1792. See Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 271.
77. See COAKLEY, supra note 75, at 28−42. Although the Whiskey Rebellion took place
in isolated parts of Western Pennsylvania, President Washington called on the governors of
Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia, as well as Pennsylvania, to provide a combined total of
12,950 militiamen. Id. at 39.
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obstructed “by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”78

In addition, the 1792 law contained two additional checks on a
president’s use of domestic constitutional violence. First, it imposed a public
proclamation requirement on the president.79 That is, in any of these three
situations—whether it be a foreign invasion, an internal insurrection, or an
obstruction of federal law by powerful combinations—the president was
required to issue a formal proclamation before using force, or in the words
of the 1792 Act: “whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the
President, to use the military force hereby directed to be called forth, the
President shall forthwith, and previous thereto, by proclamation, command
such insurgents to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes,
within a limited time.”80 Next, the 1792 law contained a two-year sunset
provision.81
At the behest of President Washington,82 Congress repealed and
replaced the 1792 Act with a new domestic violence law in 1795.83 The new
law made three important changes to the old law.84 First off, the new 1795
law removed the judicial certification requirement in situations involving
obstructions of federal law.85 Under the previous (1792) law, if the president
wanted to call forth the militia to enforce a federal law, he first had to obtain
from a federal district judge or an associate justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States a certification that the laws of the United States are being
obstructed “by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings.”86 Under the new law, the president had the
unilateral power to decide how serious or severe an obstruction was.87

78. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, § 2. In addition, the law can be read as
requiring the president to receive authorization from Congress. If Congress is not in session,
then the president’s authorization to use force automatically expires “thirty days after the
commencement of the ensuing session.” Id. at § 3.
79. See id.
80. See id. (emphasis added).
81. See id. at § 10.
82. See COAKLEY, supra note 75, at 67−68.
83. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424.
84. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787−1948,
161 (3d rev. ed. 1948), cited in Vladeck, supra note 75, at 162 n.51. Despite the differences
between the 1792 and 1795 militia acts, the 1795 act retained the 30-day time limit on the
president’s calling forth power when the Congress was in session.
85. Compare Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, with Militia Act of 1792, ch.
28, 1 Stat. 264, § 2.
86. See Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264.
87. See Militia Act of 1795, ch 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424.
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Second, the new law also modified the public proclamation
requirement.88 Under the 1792 law, the president was required to issue a
formal proclamation before he used force to respond to an emergency or
other domestic danger.89 The new law, by contrast, deleted the words “and
previous thereto.”90 Third and last, the new law removed the sunset clause.91
Unlike the 1792 law, which was temporary, the new 1795 replacement law
was designed to remain on the books permanently.92
2.

Act II: The Insurrection Act of 1807

When former Vice President Aaron Burr was accused of orchestrating
a shadowy conspiracy to create an independent republic in North America,
President Thomas Jefferson took decisive military and legal actions to
apprehend the conspirators and halt Burr’s scheme.93 But Jefferson found
himself in a constitutional and legal catch-22. On the one hand, only state
militias could be used against domestic insurrections under the 1795 law.94
On the other hand, Aaron Burr intended to create an independent republic in
Texas.95 At that time, Texas was a Spanish dominion, not a state of the
United States, so there was no militia for Jefferson to call.96 The solution
88. Compare Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36 § 3, 1 Stat. 424, with Militia Act of 1792, ch.
28, § 3, 1 Stat. 264.
89. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, § 3 (emphasis added).
90. See Militia Act of 1795, ch 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 424.
91. Compare Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 10, 1 Stat. 424, with Militia Act of 1792, §
10, 1 Stat. 264 .
92. In fact, as amended by the subsequent set of domestic constitutional violence laws
identified in the remainder of this paper, see infra text accompanying notes 93−121, the
Militia Act of 1795 is still on the books. See 10 U.S.C. § 252.
93. See COAKLEY, supra note 75, at 77−83. See also PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE
TREASON TRIALS OF AARON BURR (2008).
94. Indeed, Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison, had advised Jefferson that
only state militias could be used against a domestic insurrection under existing law. See
COAKLEY, supra note 75, at 80.
95. According to Robert W. Coakley, historians are unclear about Burr’s true intentions.
See id. at 77−88. Some claim that he intended to take parts of Texas and the Louisiana
Purchase for himself, others, that he intended to conquer Mexico, and yet others, that he
planned to conquer most of the North American continent. Yet, whichever scenario Burr
intended, Jefferson would have still found himself in this constitutional catch-22.
96. Recall that the Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795 authorized the president to call forth
only state or local militias and only in three specific situations: invasions, insurrections, and
obstructions of federal law. This trio of triggering events for the use of domestic military
force also appears in the first Militia Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution, which allocates to Congress the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections [,] and repel Invasions.” See Alan
Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV.
919, 926 (1988).
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was legislation authorizing the use of regular soldiers to respond to such
domestic dangers.
Congress adopted this novel solution when it enacted the Insurrection
Act of 1807.97 This remarkable law consists of a single sentence and is
worded as follows:
That in all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws, either of the
United States, or of any individual state or territory, where it is lawful for
the President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose
of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly
executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for the same purposes,
such part of the land or naval force of the United States, as shall be
judged necessary, having first observed all the pre-requisites of the law
in that respect.98

This law expands the president’s authority to engage in domestic
violence in two significant ways. First, the new law applied to “all cases of
insurrection, or obstruction to the laws, either of the United States, or of any
individual state or territory.”99 In other words, the president is authorized to
use military force to enforce state laws as well as federal laws. But even
more importantly, the 1807 law not only authorized the president to “call
forth” state or local militias in these two situations (“insurrection” and
“obstruction to the laws”); for the first time the new law also authorized the
president to activate federal troops.100 Prior to 1807, the president had to rely
on state or local militias to put down rebellions and repel invasions on
United States soil. Now, beginning with the 1807 law, the president
obtained legislative authority from Congress to use regular federal troops in
addition to state and local militias to respond to domestic dangers.
In the scheme of things, Burr’s conspiracy was a small blip on the
constitutional radar. The greatest threat to the vitality of the Constitution and
to the territorial integrity of the United States was yet to come.
3.

Act III: The Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861 and
Enforcement Act of 1871

By the time a Rump Congress enacted The Suppression of Rebellion
Act on July 29, 1861,101 eleven States had already left the Union.102 The
97. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
98. Id.
99. See supra text accompanying note 95. The relevant language of the Insurrection Act
of 1807 refers to “the laws, either of the United States, or of any individual state or territory.”
100. See Vladeck, supra note 75, at 164−65.
101. Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281. In full, Section 1 of
this law consists of a single sentence and is worded as follows (emphasis added):
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1861 Act revised the existing 1795 and 1807 domestic violence laws by
authorizing President Lincoln to use military force to respond to
“rebellions.”103 In addition, Section 1 of the 1861 Act amended and replaced
Section 2 of the old 1795 Militia Act and increased the president’s military
power in two ways. 104 First, the new rebellion law replaced the previous
obstruction trigger with a much lower standard.105 Under the old law,106 an
obstruction had to be “by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings”; under the new law, by contrast, the
obstruction just had to make it “impracticable” to enforce federal laws. 107
Second, the 1861 law committed to the president’s sole discretion the initial
That whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages
of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United
States, it shall become impracticable, in the judgment of the President of the
United States, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws
of the United States within any State or Territory laws of the United States, it shall
be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of any or all
the States of the Union, and to employ such parts of the land and naval forces of
the United States as he may deem necessary to enforce the faithful execution of the
laws of the United States, or to suppress such rebellion in whatever State or
Territory thereof the laws of the United States may be forcibly opposed, or the
execution thereof forcibly obstructed.
Id.
102. The first eleven seceding states (and the dates in which they voted to leave the
Union) are South Carolina (Dec. 20, 1860), Mississippi (Jan. 9, 1861), Florida (Jan. 10,
1861), Alabama (Jan. 11, 1861), Georgia (Jan. 19, 1861), Louisiana (Jan. 26, 1861), Texas
(Feb. 1, 1861), Virginia (Apr. 17, 1861), Arkansas (May 6, 1861), North Carolina (May 20,
1861), and Tennessee (June 8, 1861). See The Confederate States of America, INFOPLEASE,
https://www.infoplease.com/history-and-government/us-history/confederate-states-america
(last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
103. In addition to listing “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages of
persons,” Section 1 of the July 1861 Act adds the words “or rebellion against the authority of
the Government of the United States” to the list of potential triggering events for the use of
military force (emphasis added). Compare Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861, § 1, 12
Stat. 281, with Militia Act of 1795, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, and with Insurrection Act of 1807, 2 Stat.
443.
104. See Vladeck, supra note 75, at 166−67.
105. Compare Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861, § 1, 12 Stat. 281, with Militia Act
of 1795, § 2, 1 Stat. 424.
106. See Militia Act of 1795, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, which authorizes the use of military force
inside the United States “whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this
act. . . .”
107. See Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861, § 1, 12 Stat. 281, which authorizes the
use of military force “whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United
States, it shall become impracticable . . . to enforce by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, the laws of the United States within any State or Territory” (emphasis added).
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determination of whether or not it was “impracticable” to execute the
laws.108
Although President Lincoln did not base his legal authority to conduct
the civil war on the 1861 Act,109 this new law nevertheless represents a
major expansion of the president’s power to commit acts of domestic
constitutional violence, or in the words of one legal scholar, “to whatever
extent the 1795 Act had removed or changed three important checks on the
President’s authority under the 1792 Act, the 1861 Act heavily diluted the
major checks that remained.”110 Yet, it should come as no surprise that the
Congress would vote to expand the president’s power to commit acts of
constitutional violence during our nation’s most serious political and
military crisis. In fact, the Congress would further expand the president’s
panoply of constitutional violence powers when it enacted a series of
“enforcement acts” in 1870 and 1871 in response to the rise of the Ku Klux
Klan in the South.111
Of particular relevance to the legal history of domestic constitutional
violence is the third Enforcement Act, which was enacted by the Congress
on April 20, 1871.112 What makes this particular law noteworthy is that it
authorizes the president to use military force to enforce constitutional
rights.113 Previous constitutional violence laws enacted by the Congress
were designed to give the president the military power to enforce federal
laws114 as well as the military power to protect the territorial integrity of the
United States.115 The third Enforcement Act, by contrast, authorizes the
president to use military force against private individuals in order to enforce

108. See id. The Suppression of Rebellion Act authorizes the use of military force
“whenever . . . it shall become impracticable, in the judgment of the President of the United
States, to enforce by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United
States. . . .” (emphasis added). Id.
109. See COAKLEY, supra note 75, at 227−30.
110. Vladeck, supra note 75, at 167 (footnotes omitted).
111. See COAKLEY, supra note 75, at 299−313. See also Michael Curtis Kent, The Klan,
the Congress, and the Court: Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and the State Action Syllogism, A Brief Historical Overview, 11 J. CONST. LAW
1381, 1398−1400 (2009).
112. Enforcement Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The first Enforcement Act was enacted on
May 31, 1870, while the second Enforcement Act was enacted on February 28, 1871. The
third Enforcement Act is also sometimes referred to as the Ku Klux Klan Act. See Alfred
Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light in State Action and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 331 (1966).
113. See Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13.
114. See, e.g., Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, § 2 ; Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1
Stat. 424 .
115. See, e.g., Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443; Suppression of Rebellion Act
of 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281.
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the constitutional rights recently granted to the former slaves under the
newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment.116
Specifically, Section 3 of the 1871 Act authorizes the president to use
military force to protect “the rights, privileges, or immunities” of “the
people” when one of two conditions are met.117 First, the president may
commit acts of domestic constitutional violence to fight an insurrection or
an unlawful combination or conspiracy in a state that obstructs or hinders
the enforcement of state or federal law, when the “constituted authorities of
such State” are unable or refuse to protect the constitutional and civil rights
of the people.118 In the alternative, the 1871 Act authorizes the president to
use military force “whenever any such insurrection, violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy shall oppose or obstruct the laws of the United
States or the . . . due course of justice under the same.”119 President Ulysses
S. Grant invoked this legislation in the fall of 1871 when he ordered United
States Army Major General Alfred H. Terry to eradicate the Klan and arrest
its members in the northern counties of South Carolina,120 and Section 3 of
the 1871 Act is still in effect to this day.121
116. For an excellent overview of the politics and history of the 1871 enforcement
legislation, see Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Justin Peck, Congress and Civil Rights: The Demise of
Reconstruction, 1871−1877, 1−22 (Aug. 29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author
at
https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.usc.edu/dist/2/77/files/2018/01/demisev2q5de.pdf).
117. The full text of Section 3 consists of a single sentence and is worded as follows:
That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or
conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder the execution of the laws
thereof, and of the United States as to deprive any portion or class of the people of
such State of any of the rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection, named in
the Constitution and secured by this act, and the constituted authorities of such
State shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail in or reuse
protection of the people in such rights, such facts shall be deemed a denial by such
State of the equal protection of the laws to which they are entitled under the
Constitution of the United States; and in all such cases, or whenever any such
insurrection, violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy shall oppose or
obstruct the laws of the United States or the due course of justice under the same, it
shall be lawful for the President, and it shall be his duty to take such measures, by
the employment of the militia or the land and naval forces of the United States, or
of either, or by other means, as he may deem necessary for the suppression of such
insurrection, domestic violence, or combinations; and any person who shall be
arrested under the provisions of this and the preceding section shall be delivered to
the marshal of the proper district, to be dealt with according to law.
Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE KU KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY
AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION 399−417 (1979).
121. Section 3 of the 1871 Act was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333. Today, it is codified at 10
U.S.C. § 253.
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The third Enforcement Act122 thus represents the last major piece of
domestic constitutional violence legislation enacted by Congress prior to the
Little Rock Crisis of 1957. To sum up our review of the relevant legislation
thus far, each time Congress has enacted legislation authorizing the
president to use military force to deal with domestic dangers, the Congress
has expanded the president’s constitutional violence powers in one way or
another. By 1957, on the eve of the Little Rock Crisis, this remarkable body
of law—and the power of the president to deploy troops inside the United
States—was codified in Sections 331 through 334 of Volume 10 of the
United States Code (10 U.S.C. §§ 331−334) as follows123:
1. Internal Insurrections: 10 U.S.C. § 331 is based on the 1807
Insurrection Act,124 authorizing the president to use military force to
respond to internal insurrections within a state.
2. Unlawful obstructions: 10 U.S.C. § 332 is based on Section 1 of the
1861 Suppression of the Rebellion Act,125 authorizing the president to
use military force to deal with unlawful obstructions of federal law.
3. Civil rights: 10 U.S.C. § 333 is based on Section 3 of the third
Enforcement Act,126 authorizing the president to use military force to
deal with private acts of violence in violation of federal law.
4. Proclamation requirement: 10 U.S.C. § 334 is based on the
proclamation requirement contained in the 1795 Militia Act. 127

Combined, this remarkable body of law remained entirely unchanged
when President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued his Proclamation and
Executive Order on the eve of his military intervention in Little Rock.128
Both Eisenhower’s formal proclamation and executive order refer to
“Statutes of the United States, including Chapter 15 of Title 10, particularly
sections 332, 333 and 334 thereof.”129 The invocation of Section 332 makes
122. Enforcement Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at10 U.S.C. §§ 251−55).
123. Today, the laws of domestic constitutional violence are codified at 10 U.S.C. §§
251−255.
124. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 331
(2006)).
125. Suppression of Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281 (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006)).
126. Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 333 (2006)).
127. Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 334
(2006)).
128. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 23, 1957)).
129. Id. Notice the mission of Section 331, which requires a request from a state
legislature or governor before the president can use force.
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perfect sense, since Governor Orval Faubus had used the Arkansas National
Guard to impede the court-ordered desegregation of Central High School,
and likewise, the reference to Section 333 also makes logical sense, since
mob violence had occurred on the grounds of Central High after Governor
Faubus had removed the Arkansas National Guard.130 This rather simple and
straightforward analysis, however, should not distract us from the larger
significance of Eisenhower’s fateful military action in the fall of 1957: the
potentially crucial role of violence or the threat of violence in the field of
constitutional law. In short, the meaning and vitality of the Constitution—or
in the case of Little Rock, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and of
the principle of equal protection of laws—might depend less on the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and more on the
president’s willingness to use force.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LAWS OF CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY?
To sum up our survey of domestic constitutional violence thus far, the
Constitution vests broad executive powers to the president, while the
domestic violence statutes discussed above delegate to the president the
unilateral authority to use military force inside the United States in specific
situations. This body of law also raises paradoxical questions about the
proper role of violence in a constitutional republic and the relation between
the rule of law and the use of violence, deep and difficult questions that can
be traced back to Walter Benjamin’s classic essay on law and violence.131
Instead of attempting to answer these hoary metaphysical questions, this
paper concludes by posing a subsidiary and more mundane query: What
should we call this corpus of law?
Scholars have affixed a wide variety of labels to this body of law. By
way of example, these constitutional violence laws have often been referred
to as the “insurrection acts,”132 the “militia acts,”133 “the civil disturbance

130. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7−12 (1958). A detailed chronology of the events
leading up to the Little Rock Crisis and the deployment of federal troops in Arkansas appears
in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Additional primary source materials are available in LITTLE
ROCK USA, supra note 6.
131. See Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in SELECTED WRITINGS: VOL. 1,
1913−1926 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., 2004). The locus classicus in this
genre is Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601 (1986). For a historical
overview of the foundational role of violence during declared emergencies, see GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., U. of Chi. Press) (2005).
132. See, e.g., Thaddeus Hoffmeister, An Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century,
39 STETSON L. REV. 861 (2010).
133. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power,
and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMPLE L. REV. 391, 414 (2007).
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regulations,”134 and “the law of public defense.”135 Yet, all these various
labels are problematic. On the one hand, references to such euphemisms as
“civil disturbances” or “domestic disorders” are too broad, implying that the
trigger or threshold for the use of military force is a low one, while on the
other hand, references to “the militia acts” are too narrow, since the
president is now authorized to use the regular armed forces in addition to
state militias. Likewise, references to “the law of public defense” are also
too narrow, since one of these laws, the 1871 Enforcement Act,136 broadly
authorizes the president to commit acts of constitutional violence in
response to private acts of violence that deprive individuals of their
constitutional rights. And lastly, references to “the insurrection act” are
incomplete, since the president also has the power to respond to other types
of domestic dangers as well, such as invasions and large-scale obstructions
of justice. In the alternative, we could refer to this body of law as “the
calling forth acts” based on the original language of the 1792 and 1795
militia acts, but the modern statutes no longer use this “calling forth”
formulation.
Whichever label one prefers, one must concede that “terminological
choices can never be neutral.”137 Accordingly, this paper proposes the term
“the laws of constitutional necessity.” One reason is that this label does not
take sides on the question of the source of the president’s power to commit
acts of domestic violence to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.
That is, whether this delicate power is an inherent one under Article II of the
Constitution or is a delegated one under Article I, how can a mere piece of
paper or “parchment barrier” by itself prevent a president from using the full
powers of his office to enforce his understanding of the Constitution?138 The
other reason the author prefers this formulation is that the word “necessity”
implies that constitutional violence in whatever shape or form should always
be used as a last resort and that any such use of force should be
proportionate to the threat encountered.139 In short, the president’s power to
134. See, e.g., Campisi, supra note 75.
135. See, e.g., George M. Dennison, Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of
Emergency Powers, 1776−1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 66 (1974).
136. The Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
137. See AGAMBEN, supra note 131, at 4. For a specific example of framing effects in the
development of constitutional law, see Donald Kochar, The [̶T̶a̶k̶i̶n̶g̶s]̶ Keepings Clause: An
Analysis of Framing Effects from Labeling Constitutional Rights, 45 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1021
(2018).
138. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L. J. 1011 (2003). The apt phrase “parchment barrier”
originally appeared in THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
139. In other words, I wish to invoke the longstanding common law tradition and
understanding of the defense of necessity. See, e.g., George C. Christie, The Defense of
Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L. J. 975 (1999).
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use constitutional violence, though undeniable regardless of its source,
cannot be an unlimited one in a self-governing republic like ours. Instead,
the inevitable occurrence of a domestic danger—whether it be an invasion,
insurrection, or large-scale obstruction of law—should determine the
duration and extent of any violence or threat of violence to be used in
response to the danger.140

140. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257 (2004) (arguing that the principle of constitutional necessity may override specific
constitutional limits).

